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Licitra: Evidence: "General Acceptance" and the Admissibility of Scientifi

EVIDENCE: "GENERAL ACCEPTANCE" AND THE
ADMISSIBILITY OF SCIENTIFIC TESTIMONY
Andrews v. State, 533 So. 2d 841 (Fla. 5th D.C.A. 1988)
Defendant faced sexual battery and other charges in a burglaryrape.1 Over defendant's objection, the state presented DNA-print evidence 2 identifying defendant's DNA structure as a match for a sample
taken from a vaginal swab of the victim. 3 Defendant appealed his
subsequent conviction, contending that the trial court had abused its
discretion by admitting into evidence the results of an unreliable DNAprint test.4 Florida's Fifth District Court of Appeal unanimously
HELD, that the DNA evidence offered at trial was sufficiently relevant to be admissible under Florida's Rules of Evidence.5
At common law, courts admitted expert testimony when triers of
fact were unlikely to correctly evaluate evidence by relying on common
knowledge alone. 6 However, the District of Columbia Circuit added a
significant obstacle to the admissibility of scientific evidence in Frye
v. United States.7 In Frye, a defendant convicted in a murder case
appealed the exclusion of expert testimony based on a primitive version
of the polygraphAs The Frye court affirmed the exclusion, basing its

1. Andrews v. State, 533 So. 2d 841, 842 (Fla. 5th D.C.A. 1988). Defendant also faced
charges of aggravated battery and armed burglary of a dwelling. Id.
2. Id. at 843. DNA, a molecule contained in every living organism in every cell having a
nucleus, is the molecule that carries the body's genetic information. Id. at 847. Except for
identical twins, everyone has a unique DNA structure. Id. In DNA-print testing, testers treat
a DNA molecule with a reagent which recognizes sequences of elements within the molecule,
and cuts at the sequences it recognizes. Id. at 847-48. The resulting fragments are placed in a
gel which then receives a negative electric charge. Id. at 848. The DNA fragments also have
a negative charge, causing them to run within the gel. Id. Large fragments cannot move as
fast as smaller ones. Id. The DNA is then transferred to a piece of nylon membrane and exposed
to a radioactive probe, so that its pattern will be susceptible to exposure on X-ray film. Id.
The pattern on the developed film allows the researcher to "see" the subject's DNA structure. Id.
3. Id. at 843. The testers indicated that one person in 840 million would be likely to have
a DNA structure matching the sample taken from the swab. Id.
4. Id. at 842-43.
5. Id. at 851.
6. See Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923); see also MCCORMICK
ON EVIDENCE § 203, at 605 (E. Cleary 3d ed. 1984) (stating that in Frye, defendant relied on
the traditional rule governing expert testimony).
7. See Frye, 293 F. at 1014.
8. Id. at 1013. This machine assessed veracity by monitoring changes in a single body
function, systolic blood pressure. Id.
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holding on the lack of general acceptance of the proto-polygraph among
psychologists and physiologists. 9 Frye established that expert testimony was admissible only when the principle or discovery underlying
the proposed testimony had gained general acceptance in the relevant

scientific community. 10
Although some courts have used Frye's general acceptance rule to

exclude arguably reliable evidence,", general acceptance has not been
uniformly applied to determine the admissibility of scientific evidence.12
In Coppolino v. State, 13 defendant appealed his murder conviction. He
contended that the trial court had erroneously admitted the results
of a newly developed toxicological test able to detect previously unde-

tectable toxins in the body. 4 Florida's Second District Court of Appeal
upheld the admissibility of the toxicological test results. 15 Although
Coppolino referred to Frye, 6 the court declined to overturn trial court

9.

Id. at 1014.

10. Id.; see also E.

IMWINKELRIED,

P.

GIANNELLI,

F. GILLIGAN, & F.

LEDERER,

COURTROOM CRIMINAL EVIDENCE § 605, at 120 (1987) (stating that Frye imposed on propo-

nents of scientific evidence the special burden of demonstrating that the technique at issue was
generally accepted by the scientific field to which it belonged).
11. See, e.g., United States v. Alexander, 526 F.2d 161 (8th Cir. 1975) (upholding the
exclusion of polygraph evidence on the basis of insufficient scientific acceptance); Lindsey v.
United States, 237 F.2d 893 (9th Cir. 1956) (overturning the admission of an interview recorded
while the interviewee was under the influence of sodium pentothal); United States v. Hearst,
412 F. Supp. 893 (N.D. Cal. 1976) (upholding the exclusion of psycholinguistic testimony due
to its lack of general acceptance among psychological and scientific authorities).
12. See, e.g., United States v. Franks, 511 F.2d 25, 33 n.12 (6th Cir. 1975) (upholding the
admission of spectrographic analysis because courts may deem reliable scientific processes to
be generally accepted); State v. Olivas, 77 Ariz. 118, 119, 267 P.2d 893, 894 (1954) (scientific
disagreement goes to the weight and not the admissibility of evidence); People v. Allweiss, 48
N.Y.2d 40, 49-50, 396 N.E.2d 735, 740, 421 N.Y.S.2d 341, 346 (1979) (unless an expert is called
on to assess veracity, expert opinion is admissible when it can be stated with a reasonable
degree of certainty); see also Giannelli, The Admissibility of Novel Scientifw Evidence: Frye
v. United States, a Half-CenturyLater, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 1197, 1205, 1207-21 (1980) (surveying elements of Frye that courts have interpreted differently).
13. 223 So. 2d 68 (Fla. 2d D.C.A. 1968).
14. Id. at 69. The test detected abnormal amounts of succinic acid in the body of the victim,
defendant's wife. Id. at 70. Scientific witnesses used these results to conclude that the victim
had died from an overdose of succinylcholine chloride. Id. at 69-70. Defendant, an anesthesiologist, had access to and familiarity with succinylcholine chloride. Id. at 74.
15. Id. at 71.
16. Id. at 70. Coppolino did not cite directly to Frye, but rather to a portion of Frye cited
in Kaminski v. State, 63 So. 2d 339, 340 (Fla. 1953). That portion of Frye did not contain the
crucial "general acceptance" language. Had the Coppolino court invoked the general acceptance
standard, a finding of "no abuse of discretion" would have been much more difficult to reach.
Since the trial court did not find that the toxicological test had attained general acceptance, the
court would have had no apparent discretion to admit the test.
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rulings on the admissibility of evidence absent a clear showing of abuse

of discretion. 17 Coppolino found no such abuse 18 despite the testimony

of expert witnesses who challenged the methodology and conclusions
of the state's scientific witnesses. 19 Courts subsequently addressing
the admissibility of scientific evidence have used Coppolino to show
courts' discretion in admitting relevant, otherwise admissible evidence
even in the absence of general scientific acceptance. 20
Recently, courts have used a test based on the Federal Rules of
Evidence 2' to determine the admissibility of scientific evidence.2 The
Third Circuit outlined this relevancy test in United States v. Downing.23 In Downing, defendant appealed his conviction for mail fraud,
wire fraud, and interstate transportation of stolen property.- Defendant contended that the trial court had improperly excluded proffered
expert testimony on the unreliability of eyewitness testimony.2'

17. 223 So. 2d at 70-71.
18. Id. at 71.
19. Id. at 70.
20. See, e.g., Brown v. State, 426 So. 2d 76 (Fla. 1st D.C.A. 1983) (Coppolino not only
rejects Frye, but in fact utilizes a test focusing on relevancy as the key to admissibility); People
v. Barbara, 400 lich. 352, 255 N.W.2d 171 (1977) (Coppolino held that lack of general acceptance
affected the weight but not the admissibility of the evidence); Jones v. State, 716 S.W.2d 142
(Tex. App. 1986) (scientific evidence should be treated like any other evidence). But see Brown
v. State, 477 So. 2d 609 (Fla. 1st D.C.A. 1985) (Coppolino demonstrates that Florida courts
have discretion to determine whether general acceptance in the relevant scientific community
exists); People v. Alston, 79 Misc. 2d 1077, 362 N.Y.S.2d 356 (Sup. Ct. 1974) (Coppolinosupports
the notion that scientific testimony must have gained general acceptance in the field to which
it belongs to be admissible).
21. Hereinafter "Federal Rules" will be substituted for all textual references to the Federal
Rules of Evidence.
22. See, e.g., United States v. Ferri, 778 F.2d 985, 989 (3d Cir. 1985) ("D]istrict court
committed no abuse of discretion when it determined that... testimony was sufficiently reliable
to be admitted at trial."); Kruse v. State, 483 So. 2d 1383, 1385-86 (Fla. 4th D.C.A. 1986)
(expert evidence is admissible despite a lack of general acceptance if the witness is qualified as
an expert, and the evidence is material and helpful to the fact finder without unduly prejudicing
the opposing party); Hawthorne v. State, 470 So. 2d 770, 774-88 (Fla. 1st D.C.A. 1985) (Ervin,
C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (preferred approach to admissibility of scientific
evidence subsumes the general acceptance analysis into an evidence code-based inquiry focusing
on relevancy); Brown v. State, 426 So. 2d 76, 87-88 (Fla. 1st D.C.A. 1983) (rejecting Frye, and
stating that all evidence which is logically and legally relevant is admissible).
23. 753 F.2d 1224 (3d Cir. 1984).
24. Id. at 1227. Defendant was accused of participating in a scheme of fraudulent purchases
for resale purposes. Id. Eyewitness testimony was essential to prevent acquittal. Id. at 1227
n.2. A dozen eyewitnesses spent between 5 and 45 minutes negotiating with defendant. Id. at
1244 (Dumbauld, J., concurring).
25. Id. at 1228.
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On review, the Downing court noted that the Federal Rules neither
incorporated nor repudiated Frye's general acceptance standard, 26 then
detailed arguments for and against such a standard. 27 The court found
two significant flaws in the Frye test.2 First, Frye is vague, lacking
standards for determining general acceptance or the relevant scientific
community for such acceptance. 29 This vagueness impedes uniform and
orderly decisionmaking3 0 Second, Frye too frequently precludes relevant evidence due to a lag between scientific advances and judicial
acknowledgment of their general acceptance. 31 The court found this
conservative approach to clash with the liberal standard of admissibility in the Federal Rules.s
For these reasons, Downing rejected Frye as an independent, controlling standard of admissibilitym and elaborated a test based on Federal Rules 702 and 403.34 Under this test, the court must determine
that the proffered evidence is sufficiently reliable35 and material to
26. Id. at 1235. Although the Federal Rules contain no reference to Frye's general acceptance standard, the court noted that nothing in the language of the Rules suggests disapproval
of interstitial judicial rulemaking. Id.
27. Id. at 1235-37. According to the court, Frye's advantages included: allowing those most
knowledgeable about scientific matters to decide on the reliability of scientific procedures, filtering
out unproven hypotheses in isolated experiments, and providing a method by which courts could
assess the reliability of novel scientific testimony. Id. at 1235-36.
28. Id. at 1236.
29. Id.; see also Giannelli, supra note 12, at 1208-28 (detailing questions vital to the application of the general acceptance standard which Frye leaves unanswered, such as: What must
be accepted? What constitutes acceptance? When is acceptance sufficiently general? When is
evidence scientific?).
30. Downing, 753 F.2d at 1237.
31. Id. at 1236-37. The court found that this feature of Frye "unmecessarily impeded the
truth-seeking function of litigation." Id. at 1236.
32. Id. at 1229-30, 1237.
33. Id. at 1237.
34. Id. at 1237-44. Federal Rule 702 covers expert testimony. "If scientific, technical, or
other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine
a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or
education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise." FED. R. EviD. 702.
Federal Rule 403 explains when relevant evidence may be excluded. "Although relevant,
evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of
unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue
delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence." FED. R. EVID. 403.
35. Downig, 753 F.2d at 1237. In addition to general scientific acceptance, the court
suggested several factors that affect the reliability of the proffered evidence. Id. at 1238-39.
Among these factors are the relation between the disputed technique and more established
scientific procedures; the existence of a specialized literature dealing with the technique; the
professional stature of expert witnesses; the nonjudicial uses to which the technique is put; and
the frequency and type of error produced by the technique. Id.; see also Giannelli, supra note
12, at 1235 (to be relevant, evidence must be reliable).
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the jury's resolution of factual disputes.- Evidence meeting these
criteria is admissible unless its probative value is substantially outweighed by its potential to overwhelm, confuse, or mislead the jury.3 7
Under this approach, lack of general acceptance does not cause inadmissibility per se, but weighs in the determination of whether the
evidence is sufficiently reliable to assist the fact finder.38 Having articulated the Federal Rules-based test for scientific evidence, the Downing
court remanded the case to the trial court for an evidentiary hearing
consistent with the court's opinion.3 9
In the instant case, the Fifth District Court of Appeal chose not
to apply Frye,40 and instead endorsed a relevancy test for determining
the admissibility of scientific evidence. 41 In his appeal, defendant had
challenged the admissibility of the results of the specific DNA test
administered to him, rather than the admissibility of DNA-print evidence in general.4 Nevertheless, the court found that the novelty of
DNA-print evidence called for re-examination of both the specific ad3
ministration of the test and the general theory supporting it.4
To determine the general admissibility of DNA-print evidence, the
instant court first studied the Florida standard for admissibility of
scientific evidence- and confessed its uncertainty as to Frye's status
in Florida. 45 The Florida Supreme Court had neither accepted nor

36. See Downing, 753 F.2d at 1242. The court requires an on-the-record, detailed proffer
explaining the precise relevance of the proposed testimony to disputed facts of the case. Id.;
see also MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 185, at 541-42 (E. Cleary 3d ed. 1984) (for material
evidence to be relevant, it must not only relate to a disputed factual issue, but have probative
value in the resolution of that issue).
37. See Downing, 753 F.2d at 1237. The court initially spoke in terms of the tendency of
the evidence to overwhelm, confuse, or mislead the jury rather than the prejudicial effect of
the evidence. Id. at 1237, 1239. However, part V of the opinion demonstrates that the balancing
test to which the court refers is the one described by Federal Rule 403. Id. at 124243.
38. Id. at 1238.
39. Id. at 1244.
40. Andrews, 533 So. 2d at 846-47.
41. Id. The court proposed that the relevancy approach be followed in Florida courts generally. Id. at 847.
42. Id. at 843. Defendant's test was administered by Lifecodes Corporation, which
specializes in DNA identity testing. Id. Lifecodes is licensed as a clinical laboratory by the
State of New York. Id. at 848. The company performs DNA identity tests for forensic and
paternity purposes, as well as for the diagnosis of genetically-related diseases. Id. at 849.
43. Id. at 843.
44. Id. at 843-47.
45. Id. at 843. Due to the substantial similarity of Florida's Evidence Code to the Federal
Rules of Evidence and other state codes based thereon, the court reviewed both federal and
state cases. Id. at 846-47.
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rejected Frye,46 while at least two district courts of appeal had
explicitly or implicitly adopted a relevancy test.47 The instant court
then recommended that Florida follow the relevancy approach outlined
in Downing. The court reasoned that an approach based on the Federal Rules would, like Frye, prevent the admission into evidence of
unreliable testimony, but would be less likely than Frye to exclude
49
reliable testimony.
Having endorsed the relevancy test, the instant court then applied
the test to determine the admissibility of DNA-print evidence.50 The
court first examined the qualifications of the expert witnesses, all of
whom testified for the state. 51 The court next considered the indicia
of reliability of DNA-print testing.52 Testimony at trial revealed that
DNA-print testing had been in existence for ten years, its results
were routinely used in other disciplines, and the procedure was generally accepted in the scientific community.' Finally, the court
analyzed the procedures in the DNA test administered to appellant,
and found each of appellant's allegations of methodological flaws to be
without merit!' The court observed that if the DNA test is improperly
administered, it ordinarily yields no result rather than an incorrect
one.! Appellant's inability to produce experts to testify against the
DNA test administered to him further weakened his case.5 6

46. See id. at 844-45.
47. Id. at 844-46. Those courts were the First District Court of Appeal in Brown v. State,
426 So. 2d 76 (Fla. 1st D.C.A. 1983) and the Fourth District Court of Appeal in Kruse v. State,

483 So. 2d 1383 (Fla. 4th D.C.A. 1986). Id.
48. Andrews, 533 So. 2d at 847.
49. Id. at 846-47. Other authorities doubt that the relevancy test will effectively screen
out unreliable evidence, because shortcomings in the adversary process may impair full exploration of the technique's unreliability, and juries are not qualified to evaluate scientific reliability.
See Giannelli, supra note 12, at 1239-45.
50. See Andrews, 533 So. 2d at 849-50.
51. Id. at 847. The examination showed each expert to be experienced and well-trained.
See id.
52. Id. at 84748.
53. Id. Other indicia of reliability were that a number of laboratories around the world
perform DNA-print tests, and that the discoverer of a reagent involved in the procedure had
won a Nobel Prize for that discovery. Id.
54. Id. at 848-49. Specifically, appellant contended that the gel used in the process was
measured against a relative rather than absolute quality standard. Id. at 849. Appellant further
challenged the statistical accuracy of the calculation that one person in 840 million would have
a DNA structure matching the sample taken from the swab. Id.
55. Andrews, 533 So. 2d at 849. Testimony also revealed that Lifecodes used control samples
to further safeguard against error. Id.
56. Id. at 851. Although an inability to demonstrate disagreement among experts about
the reliability of the procedure would seem dispositive under Frye, courts applying the relevancy
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Returning to the question of the admissibility of DNA-print evidence in general, the instant court found that such evidence met the
standards for admissibility imposed by Florida's version of Federal
Rule 702. 57 First, the witnesses were qualified as experts.5 Second,
the DNA-print test results were helpful to the jury. 59 The only remain-

ing part of the admissibility inquiry was determining whether the
probative value of the testimony was substantially outweighed by its

potential prejudicial effect. 6° The court noted that DNA-print testing,
unlike fingerprint or bite-mark analysis, does not permit the fact finder
to examine physical evidence and independently evaluate the expert's
conclusions.61 While this feature warranted special caution, the court
found that this alone did not make the evidence so unreliable as to

justify its exclusion.62
The general acceptance standard articulated in Frye rests on the

tacit assumption that only the scientific community may properly
evaluate the reliability of scientific evidence.6 As a result, Frye's

test may exclude evidence which all informed experts consider reliable if such evidence is highly
prejudicial. See'Downing, 753 F.2d at 1242-43 (explaining that the balancing test in Rule 403
is especially important when eyewitness testimony accompanies fingerprints or other such physical evidence).
57. Andrews, 533 So. 2d at 849-51. FLA. STAT. § 90.702 differs from Federal Rule 702,
supra note 34, principally in its final clause:
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact
in understanding the evidence or in determining a fact in issue, a witness qualified
as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education may testify
about it in the form of an opinion; however, the opinion is admissible only if it
can be applied to evidence at trial.
FLA. STAT. § 90.702 (1987) (emphasis added).
58. Cf. supra note 34 (quoting Federal Rule 702).
59. Andrews, 533 So. 2d at 850. It is questionable whether appellant could have been
convicted without the DNA-print evidence. Although appellant matched the general physical
description of the assailant, the victim could not positively identify appellant. Id. at 842. An
analysis of the semen sample taken from the victim revealed only that appellant's blood type
matched that of the assailant. Id. at 842-43. However, like 65 percent of the male population,
appellant had type "0" blood. Id. at 843. The most damaging circumstantial evidence against
appellant was that his fingerprints were found on a screen that was removed from the victim's
window on the day of the assault. Id.
60. Id. at 849.
61. Id. at 850. The DNA-print test would only allow the jury to observe X-ray photographs
of markings purported to be bands of DNA. Id. at 849.
62. Id. at 850.
63. See supra note 27; see also Downing, 753 F.2d at 1237-38 (asserting that under Frye,
those most knowledgable about scientific matters decide on the reliability of scientific procedures);
United States v. Addison, 498 F.2d 741, 743-44 (D.C. Cir. 1974) ('The requirement of general
acceptance in the scientific community assures that those most qualified to assess the general
validity of a scientific method will have the determinative voice.").
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general acceptance standard requires courts to delegate their authority
to evaluate the reliability of proffered evidence when that evidence is
scientific. However, as Downing noted, Frye provided no guidelines
for identifying either general acceptance or the relevant scientific
field.4
This definitional vagueness permits a court to retain significant
control in determining the reliability of scientific evidence. By broadening or narrowing its criteria for general acceptance and the relevant
scientific field, a court applying the Frye standard effectively can
determine the outcome of the reliability inquiry despite the delegation
of authority Frye tacitly demands.6 Under Frye, the court may tailor
the notions of general acceptance and relevant scientific field so that
scientific opinion will support the court's own preliminary determinations of the reliability of scientific evidence.
As Coppolino demonstrates, however, the court's ability to control
the outcome of the reliability determination under Frye is limited. In
Coppolino, two factors operated against the admissibility of the toxicological test results under Frye. First, the newness of the test rendered widespread acceptance of its reliability impossible.6 Second, by
narrowing the relevant scientific field to only those scientists familiar
with the test,67 questions from the state's scientific witnesses6 about
the reliability of the toxicological test prevented a finding of general
acceptance. Under Frye, a court unable to find general acceptance
may not admit the scientific evidence. By ruling that the trial court

64. Downing, 753 F.2d at 1236; see also supra note 29 and accompanying text.
65. Douming, 753 F.2d at 1236. The Downing court noted:
[T]he vague terms included in the standard have allowed courts to manipulate the
parameters of the relevant "scientific community" and the level of agreement needed
for "general acceptance." Thus, some courts, when they wish to admit evidence,
are able to limit the impact of Frye by narrowing the relevant scientific community
to those experts who customarily employ the technique at issue.
Id.; see also Giannelli, supra note 12, at 1208-11, 1215-16 (discussing the difficulties of applying
Frye when: a scientific technique falls within the domain of more than one discipline; the court
must consult a subspecialty within a scientific field; agreement among scientists is substantial
but not nearly unanimous; and experts' careers are tied to evidence on which they testify).
66. Coppolino, 223 So. 2d at 69. Although some portions of the toxicological test were
standard, the overall procedure was new when considered in Coppolino. Id.
67. See supra note 65.
68. 223 So. 2d at 70: see also supratext accompanying note 19.
69. See Brown v. State, 426 So. 2d 76, 87 (Fla. 1st D.C.A. 1983) (noting that if Frye had
been employed in Coppolino, the test results would have been inadmissible and adding, "[A!
strict adherence to Frye would severely curtail trial court discretion.").
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was within its discretion in admitting the toxicological test results,
the Coppolino court refused to endorse Frye's tacit delegation of judicial authority to determine the reliability of scientific evidence. Coppolino thus effectively asserts that the ultimate determination of reliability rests with the court rather than the scientific community. 7°
The instant court's adoption of the relevancy test accomplishes
directly what Coppolino accomplished indirectly: giving the court ultimate authority to determine the reliability of scientific evidence.

Like Coppolino, the instant decision does not reject Frye outright.
The relevancy test incorporates Frye's underlying premise that a show-

ing of reliability is a proper foundation for the admissibility of scientific
evidence.", Under the relevancy test, a judicial finding that a scientific
procedure has gained general acceptance in the scientific community
may still be the key factor in the determination of admissibility.72
However, the relevancy test requires that the court consider general
acceptance with other factors that indicate helpfulness to a jury and

prejudice to the opposing party.7 By so requiring, the relevancy test
openly 'weighs factors of reliability which courts applying Frye may
consider sub silentio, perhaps pursuant to a determination of whether
general acceptance exists in the relevant scientific field. 74 Such openness promotes the uniform and orderly decisionmaking that the Downing court found to be impeded by Frye's definitional vagueness.7 5

Although the instant decision promotes admissibility of scientific
evidence in general, and DNA-print evidence in particular,76 it is not

70. Cf. United States v. Williams, 583 F.2d 1194, 1198 (2d Cir. 1978) ("In testing for
admissibility of a particular type of scientific evidence, whatever the scientific 'voting' pattern
may be, the court cannot in any event surrender to scientists the responsibility for determining
the reliability of that evidence.").
71. See Giannelli, supra note 12, at 1235 ('CThe probative value of scientific evidence...
is connected inextricably to its reliability; if the technique is not reliable, evidence derived from
the technique is not relevant.").
72. See Domning, 753 F.2d at 1238 ("In many cases... the acceptance factor may well
be decisive, or nearly so.").
73. See McCoRUICK, supra note 6, § 203, at 609 ("In... treating the yeas and nays of
the members of a scientific discipline as but one indication of the validity, accuracy, and reliability
of the technique, the traditional balancing method focuses the court's attention where it belongs
- on the actual usefulness of the evidence in light of the full record developed on the power
of the scientific test.").
74. See supra note 65 and accompanying text.
75. See supra text accompanying note 30.
76. The court's finding that DNA-print evidence is generally reliable may serve as a basis
for judicial notice of the reliability of such evidence in future cases. See C. WRIGHT & K.
GRAHAM, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 5168, at 88-89 (1978) (describing the process
by which expert testimony in individual cases becomes a basis for judicial notice in future cases).
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a completely satisfactory vehicle for the court's endorsement of the
relevancy test. Because the court found DNA-print tests generally
accepted in the scientific community, 77 the court could have reached
the same holding under Frye that it reached by applying the relevancy
test. 78 The court's argument in favor of the relevancy test would have
been more compelling if the relevancy test had been necessary to
avoid a different, less just ruling under Frye. Nevertheless, because
the instant court allied itself with courts supporting the relevancy
test, the importance of the test for Florida is augmented. Hopefully,
the state legislature or court of last resort will follow the lead of
Andrews with a more authoritative determination on the admissibility
of scientific evidence in Florida.
Edward Licitra

77. See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
78. Andrews, 533 So. 2d at 877 n.6 (corroborating state's assertion that evidence in the
instant case would meet Frye standard as well as relevancy test).
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